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<XML><RECORDS>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Haser, Verena</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2005</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphor, metonymy, and experientialist philosophy : challenging cognitive semantics</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Berlin; New York</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Mouton de Gruyter</PUBLISHER>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>003712251</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>revised version of PhD thesis submitted in 2003Critique of Lakoff/Johnson approach to cognitive linguistics.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Hiraga, Masako K.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2005</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphor and iconicity : a cognitive approach to analyzing texts</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Basingstoke; New York</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Palgrave Macmillan</PUBLISHER>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>003703841</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Refining Peirces division of icons:</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Chilton, Paul</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2004</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Analysing political discourse : theory and practice</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>London</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Routledge</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xiv, 226</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0415314712; 0415314720 (</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>British Library</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Integrates cognitive linguistic insights and critical discourse analysis.p. 17 Re Dunbar and Mithen - "Though anthropologists call it 'social', it is a short step to seeing it as 'political', or proto-political."</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2004</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Don't think of an elephant!: know your values and frame the debate: the essential guide for progressives</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>White River Junction, Vt.</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Chelsea Green</PUBLISHER>
	<ISBN>1931498717 (pbk. alk. pa</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>JA85.2.U6 L35 2004320.51</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>by George Lakoff.Theory & application -- Framing 101 -- Right wing power grab -- What's in a word? -- Metaphors of terror -- Metaphor and war, again -- Betrayal of trust : beyond lying -- From theory to action -- Q&A -- How to respond to conservatives.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Musolff, Andreas</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2004</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphor and political discourse : analogical reasoning in debates about Europe</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Basingstoke</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Palgrave Macmillan</PUBLISHER>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>003708980</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Discourse Analysis</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Corpus</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>political discourse</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Starts with quoting from Hobbes'</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Rakova, Marina</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2003</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The extent of the literal : metaphor, polysemy and the theories of concepts</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Basingstoke ; New York</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Palgrave Macmillan</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>x, 232 p</PAGES>
	<ISBN>140390233X</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>Oxford ; Trinity College</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>23 cmIncludes bibliographical references and indexP. 3 Main of book: "bring into serious doubt a widespread assumption concerning the literal-metaphorical distinction"The "standard assumption": "for a large number of words ... only one meaning has to be considered as literal or basic, and all the other meanings have to be treated as its metaphorical extensions"- Gives brief overview of these theories: I. A. Richards, Max Black, Monroe Beardsley, Nelson Goodman, Eva Kittay, Josef Stern, Davidson (metaphorical expressions mean what they literally mean - different from what they are intended to mean)p. 18 Cognitive linguistic revolution began with Johnson & Lakoff 1980p. 24 - 28 critique of experientialism</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2002</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Moral politics : how liberals and conservatives think</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Chicago</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>University of Chicago Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xv, 471</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0226467708 (cloth)022646</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>Hn90.m6 l34 2002</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>2001051052Gba2-48836George Lakoff.Includes bibliographical references (p. [427]-451) and index.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Johnson, Mark</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2002</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metafory, kterými žijeme</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Brno</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Host</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>282</PAGES>
	<ISBN>8072940716</ISBN>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive linguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>MetBib</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Czech translation of 'Metaphors we live by'</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Núñez, Rafael E.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2000</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Where mathematics comes from: how the embodied mind brings mathematics into being</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>New York</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Basic Books</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xvii, 493</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0465037704</ISBN>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>5148814</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<CALL_NUMBER>QA141.15 .L37 2000510</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>00034216George Lakoff, Rafael E. Núñez.Includes bibliographical references (p. 453-472) and index.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Johnson, Mark</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1999</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>New York</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Basic Books</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xiv, 624</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0465056733 (acid-free pa</ISBN>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>4281795</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<CALL_NUMBER>BD418.3 .L35 1999128</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>98037113George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.Includes bibliographical references (p. 584-601) and index.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Strauss, Claudia</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Quinn, Naomi</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1997</YEAR>
	<TITLE>A cognitive theory of cultural meaning</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Cambridge</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Cambridge University Press</PUBLISHER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Corpus Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Common introduction (over 130 pages) followed by three studies by Quinn and one by StraussThe book takes a connectionist approach to anthropology deriving from work on schemas and scenarios.Start with assertion that most anthropologists would subscribe to both competing views of culture:"'cultures' are not bounded, coherent, timeless systems of meanings (as we caution our advanced students) and ... human action rests on networks of often highly stable, pervasive, and motivating assumptions that can be widely shared within social groups while variable between them (as we teach undergraduates in Anthropology 101."  (p. 4)  --> the problem for anthropology is </NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Fass, Dan</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1997</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Processing metonymy and metaphor</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Contemporary studies in cognitive science and technology ; v.1</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Greenwich, Conn. ; London</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Ablex Pub. Corp</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xi, 501p</PAGES>
	<ISBN>1567502326 (pbk); 156750</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>British Library</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>ill ; 24cm, casedIncludes bibliographical references and index</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1996</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Moral politics: what conservatives know that liberals don't</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Chicago</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>University of Chicago Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xi, 413</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0226467961 (cloth alk. p</ISBN>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>3569848</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<CALL_NUMBER>HN90.M6 L35 1996172</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>95047690George Lakoff.Includes bibliographical references (p. [389]-413).</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Mac Cormac, Earl R.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1989</YEAR>
	<TITLE>A cognitive theory of metaphor</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>A Bradford book</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Cambridge, Mass. ; London</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>MIT Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>x, 254p</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0262631245 (pbk); 026213</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>Cambridge ; Glasgow ; Ki</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Cognition</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Formalisms</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Philosophy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Anthropology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Bibliography: p243-249. - Includes indexHardback edition in 1985</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Turner, Mark</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1989</YEAR>
	<TITLE>More than cool reason : a field guide to poetic metaphor</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Chicago ; London</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>University of Chicago Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xii, 230p</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0226468127 (pbk); 022646</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>Birmingham</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>23cm, casedBibliography: p219-220. - Includes index</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Kittay, Eva Feder</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1987</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphor : its cognitive force and linguistic structure</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Oxford</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Clarendon</PUBLISHER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>ill 22cmTries to look at metaphor in use. Broadly compatible with the assumptions of the cognitive metaphor theory but wants to look at metaphor "based on its utterance" ... "Without an expressive medium we most likely should not be able to form metaphors or even think metaphorically." (p. 14)Briefly overviews metaphor from Richards to Black and critiques Davidson (see article Kittay 1995) claiming that "[metaphors] are not limited to phrases or sentences but can take the form of a larger text" (p. 19)Stresses that: "In simile, the 'like' is itself a metaphor. This metaphor is not merely one 'among endless devices'; it is the paradigmatic device for pointing out analogies and making comparisons which cross the bounds of our usual categories."Continues to describe the history as going from 'interactionist' theory (Richards, Black) to  'perspectival' theory (Burke)Outlines the interactionist view (pp. 22-23) and uses that as the jumping off point for defining the perspectival view:1. Metaphors are sentences, not isolated words- the context is important but a sentence as such isn't necessary - sometimes a phrase is enough p. 24 "a unit of metaphor is any unit of discourse in which some conceptual or conversational incongruity emerges."2. A metaphor consists of two components- discusses problems with tenor/vehicle3. There is a tension between these two components.- 4. These components need to be understood as systems.5. The meaning of a metaphor arises from an interplay of these components.6. The meaning of metaphor is irreducible and cognitive.Will use 'semantic fields' theory to elaborate some of these points.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1987</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Chicago</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>University of Chicago Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xvii, 614</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0226468038</ISBN>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>1163574</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<CALL_NUMBER>P37 .L344 1987401/.9</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>86019136GB87-48861George Lakoff.Bibliography: p. 589-600.Includes indexes.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Johnson, Mark</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1980</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphors we live by</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Chicago</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>University of Chicago Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xiii, 242</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0226468011</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>P106 .l235</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>80010783George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.Bibliography: p. 241-242.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Goffman, Erving</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1975</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Harmondsworth, UK</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Penguin</PUBLISHER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>sociology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>social psychology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>frame analysis</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>model and metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>1. Introduction2. Primary Frameworks3. Keys and Keying4. Design and Fabrications7. Out-of-Frame Activity8. The Anchoring of Activity9. Ordinary Troubles10. Breaking Frame11. The Manufacture of Negative Experience12. The Vulnerabilities of Experience13. The Frame Analysis of Talk14. Conclusions</ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>20cm Pbkfrom </NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Turner, Victor</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1974</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Dramas, fields, and metaphors : symbolic action in human society</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Ithaca, N.Y.; London</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Cornell University Press</PUBLISHER>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>000655864</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>anthropology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>social action</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>ritual</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>symbolic action</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>from </ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>[by] Victor Turnergeneal table, maps 22cmChap 1. Social dramas and metaphors"In moving from experience of social life to conceptualization and intellectual history, I follow the path of anthropologists almost everywhere. Although we take theories into the field with us, these become relevant only if and when they illuminate social reality. Moreover, we tend to find very frequenly that it is not a theorist's whole system which so illuminates, but his scattered idea, his flashes of insihgt taken out of systemic context and applied to scattered data. ... The intuitions, not the tissue of logic connecting them, are what tend to survive in the field experience." (p. 23)concepts that he will deal with are: 'social drama', the processual view of society', 'social anti-structure', 'multivocality', 'polarization of ritual symbols' -- "All are pervaded by the idea that human social life is the producer and product of time, which becomes its measure - an ancient idea that has had resonances in the very different work of Karl Marx, Emile Drukheim, and Henri Bergson." (p. 23-24)"The social world is a world in becoming, not a world in being (except insofar as 'being' is a description of the static, atemporal models men have in their heads), and for this reason studies of social structure </NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1970</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Irregularity in syntax</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Transatlantic series in linguistics</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>New York,</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Holt Rinehart and Winston</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xvi, 207</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0030841453</ISBN>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>2671465</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<CALL_NUMBER>PE1369 .L27425</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>General</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>72118094Thesis--University of Indiana, 1965.Bibliography: p. 206-207.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>7</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Harvard University. Computation Laboratory.,</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1965</YEAR>
	<TITLE>On the nature of syntactic irregularity</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>[Cambridge, Mass.</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Harvard University</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>1 v. (various pagings)</PAGES>
	<ACCESSION_NUMBER>2636660</ACCESSION_NUMBER>
	<CALL_NUMBER>P291</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Report No. NSF-16 to The National Science Foundation of Mathematical Linguistics and Automatic Translation; Anthony G. Oettinger, principal investigator; Harvard University, The Computation Laboratory.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Ponterotto, Dianne</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2000</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The cohesive role of cognitive metaphor in discourse and conversation</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Barcelona, Antonio</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
	</SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and metonymy at the crossroads: A cognitive perspective</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Berlin; New York</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Mouton de Gruyter</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>283-298</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive discourse study</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cohesion</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>information management</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>knowledge integration</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>role of conceptual metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>role of memory</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Diane Ponterotto claims that metaphor has a central role in the structuring of conversation and proposes to regard conceptual metaphor as a fundamental part of cognitive theories of discourse. The model of discourse analysis used by the author (the &quot;blueprint&quot; model proposed by Tomlin et al.), requires that the interlocutors achieve &quot;knowledge integration&quot; and &quot;information management&quot; if the conversation is to be successful. Ponterotto claims that metaphor is the conceptual device that guarantees the satisfaction of this requirement. Then she briefly discusses the complexity of the factors intervening in the coherence underlying the apparent formlessness of a conversation and emphasizes the role of memory and storage in our ability to hold a conversation. She claims that metaphor also facilitates the storage and retrieval of information. Her two brief case studies - one on the script of a film scene and another on a recorded authentic conversation - show that a major metaphor normally provides the heuristic frame, as she calls it, for the rest of the conversation, which then calls up a complex web of thematically related conceptual metaphors that are used to explore and elaborate the major theme in the conversation. Metaphor networks often constitute the backbone of conversation and give it cohesion.(Antonio Barcelona)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Grady, Joseph</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1999</YEAR>
	<TITLE>A typology of motivation for conceptual metaphor: Correlation vs. resemblance</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Gibbs, Raymond W.</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Steen, Gerard</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
	</SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor in cognitive linguistics : selected papers from the fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam, July 1997</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Amsterdam</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>John Benjamins</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>79-100</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Steen, Gerard</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1999</YEAR>
	<TITLE>From linguistic to conceptual metaphor in five steps</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Gibbs, Raymond W.</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Steen, Gerard</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
	</SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor in cognitive linguistics: selected papers from the fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam, July 1997</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Amsterdam; Philadelphia</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>John Benjamins</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>57-79</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>one-shot - systematic metaphors (p. 59)Step 1. Metaphor focus identificationsometimes the metaphor is implicit and sometimes explicitStep 2. Metaphorical idea identificationStep 3 Nonliteral comparison identificationStep 4 Nonliteral analogy identificationStep 5 Nonliteral mapping identification6th step may have to be added if systematic metaphors only are considered - to compare across a number of expressions</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1997</YEAR>
	<TITLE>How unconscious metaphorical thought shapes dreams</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Stein, Dan J.</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
	</SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Cognitive Science and the Unconscious</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Washington, DC</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>American Psychiatric Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>89-120</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1993</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Contemporary theory of metaphor</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Ortony, Andrew</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
	</SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and thought, 2nd edition</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Cambridge</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Cambridge University Press.</PUBLISHER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Summary of metaphor:The Nature of Metaphor Metaphor is the main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning. Much subject matter, from the most mundane to the most abstruse scientific theories, can only be comprehended via metaphor. Metaphor is fundamentally conceptual, not linguistic, in nature. Metaphorical language is a surface manifestation of conceptual metaphor. Though much of our conceptual system is metaphorical, a significant part of it is nonmetaphorical. Metaphorical understanding is grounded in nonmetaphorical understanding. Metaphor allows us to understand a relatively abstract or inherently unstructured subject matter in terms of a more concrete, or at least a more highly structured subject matter. The Structure of Metaphor Metaphors are mappings across conceptual domains. Such mappings are asymmetric and partial. Each mapping is a fixed set of ontological correspondences between entities in a source domain and entities in a target domain. When those fixed correspondences are activated, mappings can project source domain inference patterns onto target domain inference patterns. Metaphorical mappings obey the Invariance Principle: The image-schema structure of the source domain is projected onto the target domain in a way that is consistent with inherent target domain structure. Mappings are not arbitrary, but grounded in the body and in everyday experience and knowledge. A conceptual system contains thousands of conventional metaphorical mappings, which form a highly structured subsystem of the conceptual system. There are two types of mappings: conceptual mappings and image- mappings; both obey the Invariance Principle. Some Aspects of Metaphor The system of conventional conceptual metaphor is mostly unconscious, automatic, and is used with no noticeable effort, just like our linguistic system and the rest of our conceptual system. Our system of conventional metaphor is alive in the same sense that our system of grammatical and phonological rules is alive; namely, it is constantly in use, automatically and below the level of consciousness. Our metaphor system is central to our understanding of experience and to the way we act on that understanding. Conventional mappings are static correspondences, and are not, in themselves, algorithmic in nature. However, this by no means rules out the possibility that such static correspondences might be used in language processing that involves sequential steps. Metaphor is mostly based on correspondences in our experiences, rather than on similarity. The metaphor system plays a major role in both the grammar and lexicon of a language. Metaphorical mappings vary in universality; some seem to be universal, others are widespread, and some seem to be culture- specific. Poetic metaphor is, for the most part, an extension of our everyday, conventional system of metaphorical thought. </NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1993</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Cognitive phonology</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Goldsmith, John</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
	</SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>The last phonological rule</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Chicago; London</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>University of Chicago Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>117-146</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Asks questions about the cognitive reality of phonological rules - questions the competence/performance distinction in light of connectionism. "neural processes occur in real time. Phonological derivations do not occur in real time, but in some 'abstract time' that cannot be put in correspondence with real time." (p. 117)"there is something wrong with the foundations of generative phonology, [and] all those orderings and cycles and principles are the products of a mistaken theory." (p. 117)Suggests an alternative to simplify phonology in litght of connectionism and the workings of the brain"On thing that connectionist models do naturally is characterize cross-dimensional correlations. Those of us working in cognitive grammar have found that really complex syntax (of the 'non-core' variety, which is most of syntax) becomes tractable if it formulated in terms of direct correlations--called </NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Gibbs, Raymond W.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1993</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Process and products in making sense of tropes</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>Ortony, Andrew</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
	</SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and thought</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Cambridge</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Cambridge University Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>252-276</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Starts off by mentioning the meaning of 'trope' as 'turn, twist' in Greek - which also provided names for the long and confusing list of tropesBut also adds that other scholars in the past gave figurative language a prominent place: Quintilian, Ramus and VicoContinues that metaphors have been studied more extensively in recent years to the neglect of other tropesWill argue that there doesn't need to be a separate cognitive process for each trope (irony, hyperbole, oxymoron, idiom, etc.) or even for tropes in General as opposed to other language usageThis chapter will be concerned with the role of common ground in understanding tropes: metonymy, irony, hyperbole and understatements, oxymora, idiomsRe process of understanding:"Listeners find tropes easy to understand precisely because much of their thinking is constrained by figurative processes." (p. 253)Implicature claims (Grice, Searle) of violation and interpretation shown to be psychologically falseReports on an experiment (Gerrig, 1989) where people read the sentence 'the horse race is the most popular event' at the end of a story about horse racing and snails racing on a horse took the same time to read (|cf. claims about blending) - thus context and background knowledge established as common ground are paramountIdioms - tacit conceptualization and metaphoric mapping helps make sense - 75% of agreement on underlying images</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1992</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphors and war: The metaphor system used to justify war in the gulf</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
		<SECONDARY_AUTHOR>P</SECONDARY_AUTHOR>
	</SECONDARY_AUTHORS>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Thirty years of linguistic evolution : studies in honour of Rene Dirven on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Philadelphia</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>John Benjamins</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>463-482</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1988</YEAR>
	<TITLE>A suggestion for a linguistics with connectionist foundations</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Proceedings of the Connectionist Models Summer School</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>San Mateo, CA</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Morgan Kaufmann</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>301-314</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Crisp, Peter</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2005</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Allegory, blending, and possible situations</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>20</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>115-131</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>English studies</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mental space theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>blending theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>allegory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>extended metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>blended spaces</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>difference blended spaces/possible words</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>relation mental spaces/truth</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>reference</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>truth</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>PDF</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Allegory is closely related to but importantly different from extended metaphor. Extended metaphors set up blended spaces. Mental spaces, of which blended spaces are a subset, are radically different kinds of things from possible worlds, having, unlike possible worlds, no definable metaphysical status. Extended metaphors set up blended spaces but allegories refer to and describe possible fictional situations. The distinction between possible situations and blended spaces accounts for important differences of imaginative effect between allegory and extended metaphor. Although allegorical scenes are not blended spaces, they do have their origin in such spaces. The differences revealed between allegory and extended metaphor emphasize the need for cognitive semantics to give a detailed account of the relations between mental spaces and questions of reference and truth.(Peter Crisp)</ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>Department of English, Chinese University of Hong Kong</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Mac Arthur, Fiona</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2005</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The competent horseman in a horseless world: Observations on a conventional metaphor in Spanish and English</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>20</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>71-94</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conventional metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>horse-riding metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>CONTROL OF A FORCE IS A RIDER</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>'</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>S CONTROL OF A HORSE</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphors for emotions</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphors for thought</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphors for event</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphors for people</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Engl</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>This article examines a metaphoric theme-cast as &quot;CONTROL OF AN UNPREDICTABLE/UNDESIRABLE FORCE IS A RIDER'S CONTROL OF A HORSE&quot; -and its linguistic instantiations in English and Spanish. Examples of these instantiations are taken from a number of different sources to show how the metaphor is used in everyday language to talk about the restraint of different processes. It is found that the metaphor has a wide scope, with the metaphoric source mapping on to a variety of processes, which may be internal (like emotions or thought) or external (like events or other people). These linguistic metaphors have been used in these 2 European languages for centuries, and their continuing currency in talk about contemporary social concerns is somewhat surprising, given that the source domain that informs the metaphor is marginal in modern industrialized countries. The survival of this metaphor in two linguistic systems is discussed in relation to the convergence of a number of factors, in which the authority of the source of transmission is seen to have played a crucial role in its propagation throughout two speech communities.(Fiona Mac Arthur)</ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>Departamento de Filologias Inglesa y Alemana, Universidad de Extremadura, Caceres, Spain ; fionamac @ unex .es</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Semino, Elena</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2005</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The metaphorical construction of complex domains: The case of speech activity in English</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>20</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>35-70</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>linguistic action</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>speech activity</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>spoken communication</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>source domain of linguistic action metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>LINGUISTIC ACTION IS MOTION</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>LINGUISTIC ACTION IS  PHYSICAL TRANSFER</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>LINGUISTIC ACTION IS PH</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>I provide an account of the way in which the domain of spoken communication is metaphorically constructed in English, on the basis of the analysis of over 450 metaphorical references to speech activity in a corpus of contemporary written British English. I show how spoken communication is mainly structured via a set of source domains that conventionally apply to a wide variety of target domains, such as the source domains of MOTION, PHYSICAL TRANSFER, PHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION, and PHYSICAL SUPPORT. Each of these source domains structures a particular aspect of speech activity, such as the achievement of communicative goals, the expression of meanings and ideas, the performance of speech acts, the negotiation of mutual relationships, and so on. I suggest that the particular conceptual mappings that underlie the main patterns in my data are best seen in terms of Grady's (1997) notion of primary metaphors, that is, as simple, basic mappings that have a firm experiential basis and that apply to a wide range of different areas of experience (e.g., &quot;HELP/ASSISTANCE IS SUPPORT&quot;). However, I also show that the main primary metaphors involved in structuring the domain of speech activity can be combined into a single overall physical scenario in which interactants can move in different directions, place themselves in different positions in relation to each other, come into contact with each other in different ways, physically produce texts/utterances/speech acts, physically pass texts/utterances/speech acts to each other, and make meanings visible to each other in different ways. Finally, I argue that a corpus-based methodology has much to offer to metaphor research, particularly in the extrapolation of conceptual metaphors from linguistic data.(Elena Semino)</ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>Department of Linguistics and English Language Rowland College, Lancaster University, LAI 4YT UK; e.semino@lan-caster.ac.uk</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Ritchie, David</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2003</YEAR>
	<TITLE>"ARGUMENT IS WAR"-Or is it a game of chess? Multiple meanings in the analysis of implicit metaphor</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>18</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>125-146</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Proposes "a modification of the basid idea of conceptual mapping" ... "metaphors map cognitive responses onto prototypical situations rather than mapping 1 specific experience or concept onto another." (p. 125)</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Ritchie, David L.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2003</YEAR>
	<TITLE>"ARGUMENT IS WAR" - Or is it a game of chess? Multiple meanings in the analysis of implicit metaphors</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>18</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>125-146</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>"</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>defend</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>"</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>"</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>maneuver</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>"</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>"</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>position</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>"</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>"</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>strategy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>"</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>ARGUMENT IS WAR</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>communication studies</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>critique of Lakoff/Johnson</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mapping cognitive response onto prototypical situation</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mapping ex</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Both Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996), in their critique of Lakoff and Johnson, drew narrowly from a broad range of reasonable interpretations of the metaphors they analyzed. Expanding the interpretations vitiates many of Vervaeke and Kennedy's criticisms, but it supports their call for an open interpretation of groups of metaphors and points toward a more complex elaboration of the theories put forth by Lakoff and Johnson. The results of applying this approach to &quot;ARGUMENT IS WAR&quot; suggest that war is not necessarily the primary conceptual metaphor for contentious argument, as Lakoff and Johnson claimed. Rather, there is a complex field of contentious interactions, ranging from simple discussions through contests to all-out war: Any and all of these can be and are used as metaphors for the others. When a word or phrase like &quot;defend,&quot;&quot;position,&quot;&quot;maneuver,&quot; or &quot;strategy&quot; is used, there is no a priori way to determine whether the intended meaning is an athletic contest or a game of chess. Similar analyses are applied to other examples from the metaphor literature, and a modification of the basic idea of conceptual mapping is proposed, in which metaphors map cognitive responses onto prototypical situations rather than mapping one specific experience or concept onto another. (David Ritchie)</ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>David Ritchie, Department of Communication, Portland State University, Portland, OR 97202-0751 [e-mail: cgrd@pdx.edu]</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Zinken, Jörg</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2003</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Ideological imagination: Intertextual and correlational metaphors in political discourse</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Discourse and Society</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>14</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>507-523</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Discourse Analysis</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Political science</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Ideology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive Linguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>CMT</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>This article explores the role that metaphors play in the ideological interpretation of events. Research in cognitive linguistics has brought rich evidence of the enormous influence that body experience has on (metaphorical) conceptualization. However, the role of the cultural net in which an individual is embedded has mostly been neglected. As a step towards the integration of cultural experience into the experientialist framework in cognitive metaphor research I propose to differentiate two ideal types of motivation for metaphor: correlation and intertextuality. Evidence for the important role that intertextual metaphors play in ideological discourse comes from an analysis of Polish newspaper discourse on the tenth anniversary of the end of communism.</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Glucksberg, Sam</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2003</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The psycholinguistics of metaphor</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Trends in Cognitive Science</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>7</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>92-96</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Psycholinguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Understanding</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Can lawyers be sharks, can jobs literally be jails, and can dogs fly across lawns? Such metaphors create novel categories that enable us to characterize the topic of interest. These novel metaphorical categories are special in that they are based on outstanding exemplars of those categories, and they borrow the exemplar&acirc;s name for use as the category names. Thus &acirc;shark&acirc; can be taken as a metaphor for any vicious and predatory being. Contemporary research reveals how people can create and understand such metaphors in ordinary conversation, and suggests that we understand metaphorical meanings as quickly and automatically as we understand literal meanings.</ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>Conclusion:</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Steen, Gerard</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2002</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Identifying metaphor in language: A cognitive approach</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Style</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>36</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>386-407</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Stylistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>MM</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Identification</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Text Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Rakova, Marina</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2002</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The philosophy of embodied realism: A high price to pay?</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Cognitive Linguistics</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>13</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>215-244</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>Critique of Lakoff and Johnson's theory. Mentions other critical views. </NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Johnson, Mark</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2002</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Why cognitive linguistics requires embodied realism</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Cognitive Linguistics</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>13</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>245-263</PAGES>
	<NOTES>Response to Rakova 2002</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2001</YEAR>
	<TITLE>As advertised: A review of The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Artificial Intelligence</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PAGES>195–209</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Bortfeld, Heather</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>McGlone, Matthew S.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2001</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The continuum of metaphor processing</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>16</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>75-86</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive psychology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>continuum of metaphor processing</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor processing</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>processing set</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>psycholinguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT> We describe the explanatory value of a relativistic account of metaphor processing in which different modes of metaphor interpretation are assumed to be operative in different discourse contexts. Employing the cognitive psychological notion of a processing set, we explain why people might favor attributional interpretations of figurative expressions in some circumstances and analogical interpretations in others. Applying this logic to findings in the psycholinguistic literature on metaphor suggests that some of the competing models may in fact describe different points on a continuum of metaphor processing(Heather Bortfeld and Matthew McGlone).</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Bradie, Michael</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1998</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Explanation as metaphorical redescription</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>13</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>125-139</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive tool</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Darwin</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>evolution by natural selection</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>functions of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>heuristic tool</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor as explanation</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>philosophy of science</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>rhetorical device</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>use of metaphor in description of data</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>use of metaphor in science</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>use of metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>That scientists employ metaphors is not disputed. Metaphors serve as heuristic tools for suggesting new hypotheses, new areas of research, and new research strategies. They also function as rhetorical devices for the communication of scientific ideas. What has been contested is the role of metaphors in the more &quot;cognitive&quot; areas of science, those dealing with descriptions of data and providing and evaluating explanations. In this article, I argue for the centrality of metaphors in scientific explanations. I draw on some ideas from M. Black (1955, 1993), M. Hesse (1966), and T. S. Kuhn (1973) to sketch out a model of scientific explanation as metaphorical redescription. I close by arguing that D. Dennett's recent algorithmic interpretation of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is an exemplification of the model here sketched.(Michael Bradie)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Kupferberg, Irit</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Green, David</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1998</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphors enhance radio problem discussions</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>13</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>103-123</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>autobiographical memory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>caller/host interaction</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>discourse study</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>media studies</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>organizing metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>personal story</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>radio discussion program</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>use of metaphor in psychotherapy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>use of metaphor in public discourse</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>effects of metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Problem-discussion radio programs involve callers with problems, discussed by radio hosts. An analysis of 30 calls suggests that callers who use personal stories and organizing metaphors have successful interactions. Organizing metaphors are defined as cognitive elements that summarize recursive story-internal patterns hierarchically and present a caller's succinct evaluation of self. The connection established in spoken discourse between stories and organizing metaphors is interpreted as an indication that metaphors may constitute a type of index, or generic personal memory in autobiographical memory.(Irit Kupferberg and David Green)Callers' use of personal stories or organizing metaphors on the outcome of problem-discussion radio program conversations is investigated. Anonymous callers' (N = 30) calls to a weekly problem-discussion radio program in Israel were transcribed into English; qualitative, discourse, and variation analyses of the transcribed data were performed. Using a modified framework of A. Liddicoat's et al (1994) and R. Buttny and A. D. Jensen's (1995) phases of problem-discussion interaction, the analyses indicated that callers who utilized personal stories or organizing metaphors during the reception phases resulted in more successful psychological interventions. Several additional variables that affected the calls' outcomes, e.g., technical problems and callers' trepidation, are noted. It is concluded that the use of organizing metaphors in both media problem-discussion programs and psychotherapy are beneficial to callers and clients.(LLBA 1999, vol. 33, n. 1)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Gibbs, Raymond W.</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Moise, Jessica F.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1997</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Pragmatics in understanding what is said</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Cognition</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>62</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>51-74</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Psycholinguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>CMT</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>A central claim in cognitive science is that speakers often say things which underdetermine what they imply by their use of utterances in context. For example, in uttering Jane has three children a speaker might only say that Jane has at least three children and may have more than three, but the speaker&acirc;s utterance implicates that Jane has exactly three children. Many scholars following Grice have argued from such observations that pragmatics plays only a small part in determining what speakers say, as opposed to what they conversationally imply or implicate. We examined people&acirc;s intuitions about the distinction between what speakers say, or what is said, and what they implicate by different indicative utterances, such as Jane has three children. The data from four experiments demonstrate that people do not equate a minimal meaning (i.e., Jane has at least three children and may have more than three) with what a speaker says, but assume that enriched pragmatics plays a significant role in determining what is said (i.e., Jane has exactly three children). People further recognize a distinction between what speakers say, or what is said, and what speakers implicate in particular contexts (e.g., Jane is married). These data lend support to theories of utterance interpretation in cognitive science that pragmatics strongly influences people&acirc;s understanding of what speakers both say and communicate. </ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Vervaeke, John</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Green, Christopher D.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1997</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Women, fire, and dangerous theories: A critique of Lakoff's theory of categorization</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbol</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>12</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>59-80</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>compositionality of language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>concept/conceptualization</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>critique of Lakoff (1987)</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>idealized cognitive model</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>motivation</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>objectivist paradigm</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>philosophy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>prototype effect</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>removal prototype</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>George Lakoff (1987) put forward a new account of the standard prototype effects in 'Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind' (WF&amp;DT) that has become increasingly popular since the book's publication. We believe, however, that the theory presented in WF&amp;DT remains untenable for a number of reasons. Briefly, we argue that (a) confusions about the difference between concepts and conceptualizations led to apparent contradictions in his position; (b) his removal of prototypes from the explanation of prototype effects left open a wide range of possible and plausible explanations of such effects, many of which derive from the very objectivist paradigm he criticized; (c) his attempt to replace the compositionality of language with the notion of &quot;motivation&quot; failed, primarily because his account of motivation left it underspecified and, ultimately, took his theory out of the realm of scientific investigation; and (d) his idealized cognitive models - the core of his cognitive theory - are inadequate explanations that seem to reduce either to something very much like &quot;mental pictures,&quot; which fail as theories of representation for a host of well-known reasons, or to &quot;mental propositions,&quot; which are most amenable to the traditional models of cognition that Lakoff most strongly opposed.(John Vervaeke and Christopher Green)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Chrz, Vladimír</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1996</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Psychologie metafory II: Metafora z hlediska kognitivn</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>&Auml;eskoslovensk&Atilde;&iexcl; psychologie</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>40</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>217-227</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>psychology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive psychology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>historical overview of metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metbib</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>&Auml;l&Atilde;&iexcl;nek je druhou &Auml;&Atilde;&iexcl;st&Atilde;&shy; studie, p&Aring;ibli&Aring;&frac34;uj&Atilde;&shy;c&Atilde;&shy; psychologickou problematiku metafory z hlediska n</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>McMullen, Linda M.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1996</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Studying the use of figurative language in psychotherapy: The search for researchable questions</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>11</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>241-255</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>empirical study</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>key metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>marker of change</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor of affective state</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor of self</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor of self-other relationship</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphors for emotions</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>psychotherapy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>use of metaphor in psychotherapy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>effects of metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Much of the theoretical and conceptual writing on the use of figurative language in psychotherapy has stressed the important role that this language plays in facilitating change. A review of the empirical literature indicates that, although frequent calls have been made to investigate the change-producing effects of metaphor, we have yet to elucidate these effects through empirical research. I suggest that this domain of inquiry be left to theorists and clinicians and that empirical researchers concentrate their efforts on investigating questions that are amenable to empirical research. Some possible avenues include the study of clients'&quot;key metaphors&quot; as markers of change (Siegelman, 1990) and the conceptualizing of those domains of figurative language that are predominant in psychotherapy, specifically, metaphors of self, self-other relationships, emotion, and cognitive-affective-behavioral states.(Linda McMullen)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Vosniadou, Stella</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1995</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Analogical reasoning in cognitive development</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>10</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>297-308</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>analogical reasoning</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>analogy and metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>child</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>'</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>s developing thought</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>language development</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>psychology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>relational structure</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>development of metaphor understanding</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>In this article, I explore the role that analogical reasoning plays in the developing thought of the child. Analogical reasoning is defined as the process of identification and transfer of a relational structure from a known system (the source) to a less known system (the target). This process is more general than metaphor and can apply even between systems that belong to the same category. I argue that this process is fundamental to the acquisition and use of external representational systems such as oral and written language, arithmetic, and music and is thus an important aspect of cognitive development. The acquisition and use of external representational systems depend on the identification of correspondences between the representational system and the physical and social environment or on the identification of correspondences among different representational systems. The acquisition and use of such systems also depend on the transfer of information from one representational system to another and on the evaluation of the applicability of the information transferred for the system concerned.(Stella Vosniadou)</ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>10th Anniversary Special issue edited by Winner, Ellen 'Developmental Perspectives on Metaphor'</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Allbritton, David William</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1995</YEAR>
	<TITLE>When metaphors function as schemas: Some cognitive effects of conceptual metaphors</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>10</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>33-46</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive effect</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>functions of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor as schema</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor comprehension</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor-based schema</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>nature of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>psychology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>text representation</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>The nature of metaphor, metaphor comprehension processes, and the functions of metaphor are three distinct issues for researchers. It is suggested that the strengths and weaknesses of current theories of metaphor are dependent on the type of metaphor being examined. Recent research in the possible functions of metaphor is reviewed, including evidence that metaphors function as schemas and experimental evidence that metaphor-based schemas can affect the structure of readers' text representations.(LLBA 1996, vol. 30, n. 1)</ABSTRACT>
	<NOTES>Special issue edited by Roger J. Kreuz and Shelly Dews, 'Nonliteral Language: Processing and Use'Dept. Psychology Northwestern U., Evanston 1L 60208</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Indurkhya, Bipin</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1994</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The thesis that all knowledge is metaphorical and meanings of metaphor</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>9</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>61-73</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>omputer science</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>critique of strong thesis of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>epistemological commitment</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>interaction theory of cognition</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>meaning of</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>'</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>'</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>philosophy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>strong thesis of metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>(from INTRODUCTION)One question that has sprouted much controversy in the philosophical and cognitive science research on metaphor is whether all knowledge (or language) is metaphorical (see, e.g., Lakoff and Turner, 1989, chap. 2; Mac Cormac, 1985, chap. 3; Wheeler, 1990). This thesis, to which I refer hereafter as &quot;the strong thesis of metaphor,&quot; has been implicitly or explicitly argued for by such scholars as Arbib and Hesse (1986), Berggren (1962, 1963), Black (1962, 1979), Cassirer (1955), Emmet (1945), Hesse (1974), Richards (1936), Ricoeur (1976, 1977, 1978), Sewell (1964), Turbayne (1962), and Wheeler (1987). Two of the strongest critics of the strong thesis have been Lakoff, along with his colleagues Johnson and Turner, and Mac Cormac. This is quite interesting given the fact that these two camps have diametrically opposing views on metaphor. Their rejection of the strong thesis is perhaps the only thing they have in common. My objective in this article is to critically examine the strong thesis of metaphor. I argue that the meaning of metaphor in the strong thesis is different from the way the term has been denned by either Lakoff or Mac Cormac. Nevertheless, the meaning is quite consistent with how the term is used in everyday language. Ignoring this crucial fact has created an unnecessary controversy surrounding the strong thesis. However, once we distinguish between different meanings of metaphor, we see that, although in one sense the strong thesis appears to be trivially true, in another sense it makes a deeper epistemological commitment, which should be the bone for contention whenever its status is being questioned. In particular, I point out two nontrivial hypotheses underlying the strong thesis that are a fair game for a philosophical debate. Finally, after the different usages of the term 'metaphor' are clarified and the needless controversy surrounding the strong thesis has been dissipated, I conclude by highlighting some other important issues concerning metaphor.(Bipin Indurkhya)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Fesmire, Steven A.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1994</YEAR>
	<TITLE>What is "cognitive" about cognitive linguistics?</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>9</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>149-154</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive linguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>categorization</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive commitment</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>critique of cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>ecological situatedness</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>embodied mind</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>generalization commitment</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>image schema</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mentalism</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>narrative structure</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>philosophy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>refut</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Cognitive linguistics is founded on the cardinal methodological assumption that any theory of meaning, concepts, reasoning, or language must be congruous with our most reliable empirical inquiries into the nature of human cognition. This &quot;cognitive&quot; commitment coincides with a &quot;generalization&quot; commitment (Lakoff, 1990, p. 50) whereby any satisfactory theory of these aspects of cognition must offer empirically criticizable generalizations about human conceptualization, inference, and language. What has emerged from these commitments is a view of human understanding and experience that places our ecological situatedness at its core. Because linguistic structures are studied not in isolation from, but with an acute sensitivity to our most reliable investigations into the way human beings give coherent form to their experience, cognitive linguists have been able to illuminate the way an embodied mind adjusts to its changing environment by way of shared cognitive structures, such as image schemata, categorizations, metaphors, and narrative structures. But what exactly counts as cognitive here? Some criticisms of the cognitive semantics approach to metaphor have been based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of cognitive within this orientation (e.g., Gendlin, 1991). By clarifying the nature of a cognitive approach to human understanding and experience, I would like to forestall objections that cognitive linguistics is either, on the one hand, too intellectualistic and subjectivistic, or, on the other hand, too physicalistic in its treatment of understanding and meaning. The basic objection I address is that &quot;conceptual metaphors&quot; are overtly conceptual - that they are &quot;mentalistic&quot; to the detriment of a full-blooded account.(Steven Fesmire)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Deane, Paul D.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1993</YEAR>
	<TITLE>On metaphorical inversion</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>8</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>111-126</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>anthropomorphism</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>asymmetry</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>attribute</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mapping</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphorical inversion</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>personification</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>topic/vehicle</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Examples of metaphorical inversion, parts of conceptual metaphors that employ the same metaphorical mapping but with reversed topic-vehicle orientation (e.g., 'People are computers' vs. 'Computers are people') are examined. Metaphorical inversion is an unusual phenomenon because the usual effect of reversing a metaphor is a complete shift in the metaphor's conceptual ground. Analysis suggests an underlying asymmetry despite the common ground. One of the metaphors in the pair functions as an ordinary personification or anthropomorphism, not taken seriously or extended beyond its areas of obvious applicability to the topic. The other metaphor, by contrast, often carries moral or philosophical overtones and is actively extended in a way that undermines the entrenched attributes of its topic. (Copyright 1994, Sociological Abstracts, Inc., all rights reserved.)(LLBA 1994, vol. 28, n. 1)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1991</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Cognitive versus generative linguistics: How commitments influence results</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Language and communication</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>11</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>53-62</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Diller, Anne-Marie</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1991</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphorical coherence, verbal action, and mental action in French</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Communications</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>53</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>209-228</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cohesion</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>linguistic activity</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>verbal action</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conduit metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>container/contents relationship</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphorical coherence</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>French</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>In a rehabilitation of the metaphor by cognitive semantics, the Conduit metaphor is shown to structure the description of verbal and mental actions - target fields - along with metaphors using the source fields of food and vision. Following a cognitive schema of food, metaphorical correspondence is illustrated. The Conduit metaphor mostly relates words to ideas - the word contains the idea. This container/contents relationship is also what relates the properties of food or vision to the target field, manipulating it in a dynamic way. Just as we eat - not only to feed ourselves but for the pleasure of tasting - we speak to savor the words before getting to the ideas.(M. Perdoux in LLBA, Accession Number 9106160)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Indurkhya, Bipin</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1991</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Modes of metaphor</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>6</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>1-27</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive process underlying mode of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>computer science</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>distinction object/representation</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>interaction theory of cognition</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>interactive view of cognition</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor creating similarities</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>modes of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>nature of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>philosophy</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>In spite of some revealing insights that interdisciplinary research on metaphor has obtained in recent years, the nature of metaphor, and how and why it pervades all aspects of cognition remains enigmatic. In particular, the ability of metaphor to create similarities where none existed before seems somewhat mystical, despite several attempts to explain it cognitively. Moreover, on the surface, this characteristic seems incompatible with the accounts of metaphor that explain it on the basis of the existing similarities - structural or otherwise - between the source and the target. An attempt is made in this article to present a unifying account of metaphor from which many of its characteristics can be explained cognitively. The account is based on introducing a distinction between an object and its representation, and on an interactive view of cognition in which both the cognitive agent and the external world have an equal role to play. In this framework, it is argued that there are three different modes of metaphor, and that there are different cognitive processes underlying each mode. Moreover, there are characteristic features of each process that are imparted to the metaphors generated in that mode, and that determine what role those metaphors play in cognition.(Bipin Indurkhya)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Gibb, Heather</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Wales, Roger</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1990</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphor or simile: Psychological determinants of the differential use of each sentence form</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>5</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>199-213</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>concreteness of adjective</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>figurative comparison</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>ground of comparison</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphorical format</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>psychology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>sentence completion task</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>simile and metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>simile format</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>subjects</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>'</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>preference</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>tenor specificity</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>theme in ground of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>vehi</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>By using a sentence-completion task, figurative comparison statements were examined in relation to subjects' relative preference for the metaphorical versus the simile format (is vs. is like). Variables identified as likely predictors of one form over the other were concreteness of vehicle, specificity of the tenor, and concreteness of the predicate adjective preceding the vehicle. An explanation of the differential function of the two figurative forms is put forward in terms of the kind of themes expressed within the ground of the comparisons.(Heather Gibb and Roger Wales)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1990</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The Invariance Hypothesis: Is abstract reason based on image-schemas?</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Cognitive Linguistics</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>1</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>39-74</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive linguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>abstract reasoning</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive topology</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>image schema</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>imagistic reasoning</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>inference pattern</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>invariance hypothesis</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>LIB</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>I view cognitive linguistics as defined by the commitment to characterize the full range of linguistic generalizations while being faithful to empirical discoveries about the nature of the mind/brain.The Invariance Hypothesis is a proposed general principle intended to characterize a broad range or regularities in both our conceptual and linguistic systems. Given that all metaphorical mappings are partial, the Invariance Hypothesis claims that the portion of the source domain structure that is mapped preserves cognitive topology (though, of course, not all the cognitive topology of the source domain need be mapped). Since the cognitive topology of image schemas determines their inference patterns, the Invariance Hypothesis claims that imagistic reasoning patterns are mapped onto abstract reasoning patterns via metaphorical mappings. It entails that at least some (and perhaps all) abstract reasoning is a metaphorical version of image-based reasoning.The data covered by the Invariance Hypothesis includes the metaphorical understanding of time, states, events, actions, purposes, means, causes, modalities, linear scales, and categories. Because the source domains of these metaphorical concepts are structured by image schemas, the Invariance Hypothesis suggests that reasoning involving these concepts is fundamentally image-based. This includes the subject matter of Boolean, scalar, modal, temporal, and causal reasoning. These cases cover such a large range of abstract reasoning that the question naturally arises as to whether all abstract human reasoning is a metaphorical version of imagistic reasoning. I see this as a major question for future research in cognitive linguistics.(George Lakoff)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Gibbs, Raymond W.</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Gerrig, Richard J.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1989</YEAR>
	<TITLE>How context makes metaphor comprehension seem "special"</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>4</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>145-158</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>identical mental process</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>literal/non-literal</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>masking process</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>process of comprehension</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>processing time</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>product of comprehension</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>psycholinguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>role of context</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive psychology</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Psycholinguistic research has shown that, with appropriate context, people take no longer to understand metaphors than to understand semantically comparable literal language. This finding is often taken to suggest that identical mental processes drive the comprehension of both literal and metaphorical utterances. We suggest that this claim does not necessarily follow from the experimental results. Various masking processes could foster the &quot;incorrect illusion&quot; of equivalence. However, a parsimonious account of the processes underlying comprehension can be motivated for both metaphorical and literal utterances. What makes metaphor &quot;special&quot; is in the products of comprehension, not in the process by which metaphorical meanings are understood.(Raymond Gibbs and Richard Gerrig)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1987</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Image metaphors</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>2</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>219-222</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>central narrow portion of hourglass</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>correspondence</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>hourglass metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>image metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>image metaphor/conceptual metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mental image of hourglass</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mental image of woman</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor for woman</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>'</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>To date, this column has concentrated on conceptual metaphors - metaphors that map complex conceptual strructures in a source domain onto conceptual structures in a target domain. Take, for example, the common metaphorical understanding of life and death given by the mapping &quot;LIFE IS PRESENCE HERE,&quot; in which birth corresponds to arrival and death to departure; it is exemplified by common expressions like &quot;He passed away,&quot;&quot;There's a baby on the way,&quot;&quot;He'sstill with us,&quot; and many others. In addition to these, there is another major type of metaphor that maps conventional mental images onto other conventional mental images by virtue of their internal structure. I will refer to these as image metaphors. When Andre Breton (1931/1984) in 'Free Union' (translation by David Antin) writes, &quot;My wife . . . whose waist is an hourglass,&quot; (p. 183), we understand this as an image mapping in which the mental image of an hourglass is mapped onto the mental image of the wife, with the central narrow portion of the hourglass corresponding to the wife's waist. Image metaphors of this sort are very common, and it is important to understand their nature and the ways in which they differ from conceptual metaphors.(George Lakoff)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1987</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The death of dead metaphor</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>2</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>143-147</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>dead metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>novel metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>classification</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>The term 'dead metaphor' is a holdover from a traditional folk theory of language that has turned out not to be workable. According to the old theory, the locus of metaphor was language not thought, ordinary everyday language was &quot;literal,&quot; and only novel poetic or rhetorical expressions were candidates for being metaphors. Metaphorical &quot;life&quot; was seen in poetic novelty alone, and mundane unpoetic language supported no metaphorical life. A &quot;dead&quot; metaphor was defined relative to that theory as a linguistic expression that had once been novel and poetic, but had since become part of mundane conventional language, the cemetery of creative thought. As we saw in this column (Lakoff, 1986), the term literal is a cluster concept, defined relative to the old theory. When empirical research showed the old theory to be wrong, the term 'literal' split. The four senses making up the cluster had to be distinguished, and one could no longer use 'literal' in its old overly simplistic sense in discussions of metaphor. Like 'literal', 'dead metaphor' has been defined in a theory-dependent way. As that theory dissolves under the scrutiny of empirical research, the meaning of &quot;dead metaphor&quot; cannot remain constant. What were called dead metaphors in the old theory have turned out to be a host of quite disparate phenomena, including those metaphors that are most alive - the ones that we use constantly in everyday thought. If one wants to keep the term 'dead metaphor', it will have to come to mean something very different in contemporary theories.(George Lakoff)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Johnson, Mark</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1987</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The metaphorical logic of rape</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>2</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>73-79</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>effects of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>classical theory of metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>metaphorical reasoning</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>naming theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>philosophy</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>reasoning</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>reasoning about abstract concept</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>There is a classical theory of metaphor that says that metaphor is merely a matter of naming - of attaching words to concepts they ordinarily wouldn't go with. The naming theory contrasts with the view that metaphor is conceptual in nature, a means of understanding one domain of experience in terms of the conceptual structure of another domain. The two views contrast most vividly on the issue of whether metaphor enters into reasoning. On the naming view, metaphors cannot enter into reasoning because they have nothing to do with how we think; they are just names. On the conceptual view, metaphor plays a major role in reasoning - it is one of our principal means for comprehending and reasoning about abstract concepts. In recent years, considerable evidence has been amassed for the conceptual view, based on the role of metaphor in reasoning (see Gentner and Gentner, 1983; Holland and Quinn, 1987). This column has several goals: (a) to add to the growing body of research on metaphorical reasoning; (b) to try to clarify just what is meant by metaphorical reasoning, and to show how metaphors interact with our folk beliefs; (c) to show that metaphorical reasoning that is based on conventional metaphors is mostly an automatic process, performed unconsciously and without noticeable effort; and (d) to show that the study of metaphorical reasoning is anything but an irrelevant ivory tower enterprise. Instead, it is at the heart of many social issues of the greatest importance.(George Lakoff and Mark Johnson)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1986</YEAR>
	<TITLE>A figure of thought</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>1</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>215-225</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>everyday language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>figure of speech</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>figure of thought</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>linguistic metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>literal language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>persuasive language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>poetic language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>special language</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>For two millennia we were taught a dogma that was largely unquestioned and came to be viewed as definitional. Metaphor was called a figure of speech. As such, it was taken to be a matter of special language: poetic or persuasive language. As a matter of language, rather than thought, it was viewed as dispensible. If you have something to say, you could presumably say it straightforwardly without metaphor; if you chose metaphor it was for some poetic or rhetorical purpose, perhaps for elegance or economy, but not for plain speech and ordinary thought. Metaphor was seen as contrasting with ordinary, everyday literal language, language that could be straightforwardly true or false, that could fit the world directly or not.(George Lakoff)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1986</YEAR>
	<TITLE>The meanings of literal</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>1</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>291-296</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>biological mother</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>caretaker mother</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>complex world</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conventional literality</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mother function</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>mother metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>non-metaphorical literality</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>subject matter literality</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>surrogate mother</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>truth-conditional literality</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>LIB</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>Lakoff defines four uses of 'literal': conventional literality, subject matter literality, non-metaphorical literality, and truth-conditional literality and then goes on to say: &quot;Johnson and I discovered that the assumptions [of a monosemous use of 'literal'] are false. But it is difficult to discuss our findings using the word 'literal' in its ordinary sense, because that very use of the word presupposes the opposite of what we discovered. It would be useful if we had four separate English words for each of these four senses of literal. But we have only one word. All we can do in such a situation is point out the problem, be careful to distinguish these four senses, and suggest a possible use of literal as a technical term. I suggest here that literal, in any technical discussion, be restricted to the meaning of Literal 3 [non-metaphorical literality], the sense of being directly meaningful, without the intervention of any mechanism of indirect understanding such as metaphor or metonymy. But because of possible confusions, it is good policy to avoid the word 'literal' as much as possible in discussions of metaphor&quot;.(George Lakoff)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>10</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Wallington, A.M.</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Barnden, J.A.</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Barnden, M.A.</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Ferguson, F.J.</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Glasbey, S.R.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2003</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphoricity signals : a corpus-based investigation. Technical Report CSRP-03-05.</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Cognitive science research papers ; CSRP-03-5</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Birmingham</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>[12] p.</PAGES>
	<ISBN>Technical Report CSRP-03</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>British Library</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Corpus Linguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Corpus Linguistics</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>30cm, pbkIncludes bibliographical references</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Johnson, Mark</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>2003</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphors we live by</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Chicago; London</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>University of Chicago Press</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xiii, 276 p</PAGES>
	<ISBN>0226468372</ISBN>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Cognitive Linguistics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>21 cmIncludes bibliographical references Originally published: Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1980New afterword</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Gibbs, Raymond W.</AUTHOR>
		<AUTHOR>Steen, Gerard</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1999</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphor in cognitive linguistics : selected papers from the fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam, July 1997</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Amsterdam; Philadelphia</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>John Benjamins</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>viii, 225 p</PAGES>
	<ISBN>902723681X (Eur); 155619</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>Birmingham ; Edinburgh ;</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>23 cmConference ; Bibliography includedIncludes bibliographical references and indexThis book contains a selection of refereed and revised papers originally presented at the 5th ICLC. After an introduction by the editors, the book opens with a chapter on historical precedents for the Cognitive Linguistic theory of metaphor.</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Goossens, Louis</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1995</YEAR>
	<TITLE>By word of mouth : metaphor, metonymy and linguistic action in a cognitive perspective</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Pragmatics &amp; beyond new series ; 33</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Amsterdam</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>John Benjamins</PUBLISHER>
	<PAGES>xii, 252p</PAGES>
	<ISBN>1556193262</ISBN>
	<CALL_NUMBER>Cambridge</CALL_NUMBER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>23cm</NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Ortony, Andrew</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1993</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphor and thought</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Cambridge</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Cambridge University Press</PUBLISHER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>edited by Andrew Ortony24cm casedIn introduction Ortony starts with the distinction between </NOTES>
</RECORD>
<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Miall, David S.</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1982</YEAR>
	<TITLE>Metaphor : problems and perspectives</TITLE>
	<PLACE_PUBLISHED>Brighton</PLACE_PUBLISHED>
	<PUBLISHER>Harvester</PUBLISHER>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>Metaphor</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<NOTES>edited by David S. Miallill 23cmCollection of articles on metaphor mostly without reference to Lakoff and Johnson (once in Gentner's work)</NOTES>
</RECORD>
</RECORDS></XML>