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<RECORD>
	<REFERENCE_TYPE>0</REFERENCE_TYPE>
	<AUTHORS>
		<AUTHOR>Lakoff, George</AUTHOR>
	</AUTHORS>
	<YEAR>1986</YEAR>
	<TITLE>A figure of thought</TITLE>
	<SECONDARY_TITLE>Metaphor and Symbolic Activity</SECONDARY_TITLE>
	<VOLUME>1</VOLUME>
	<PAGES>215-225</PAGES>
	<KEYWORDS>
		<KEYWORD>metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>cognitive semantics</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>conceptual metaphor theory</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>everyday language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>figure of speech</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>figure of thought</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>linguistic metaphor</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>literal language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>persuasive language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>poetic language</KEYWORD>
		<KEYWORD>special language</KEYWORD>
	</KEYWORDS>
	<ABSTRACT>For two millennia we were taught a dogma that was largely unquestioned and came to be viewed as definitional. Metaphor was called a figure of speech. As such, it was taken to be a matter of special language: poetic or persuasive language. As a matter of language, rather than thought, it was viewed as dispensible. If you have something to say, you could presumably say it straightforwardly without metaphor; if you chose metaphor it was for some poetic or rhetorical purpose, perhaps for elegance or economy, but not for plain speech and ordinary thought. Metaphor was seen as contrasting with ordinary, everyday literal language, language that could be straightforwardly true or false, that could fit the world directly or not.(George Lakoff)</ABSTRACT>
</RECORD>
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